

CHAPTER 4

THE ROAD TO SALT

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The period from 1969 to 1980 marked a new era of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, with the negotiation of offensive and defensive arms limitations. The Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Offensive Strategic Weapons (SALT I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaties signed by President Nixon and ratified in 1972, as well as the SALT II treaty that was signed by President Carter in 1979 but never ratified, ushered in a period of bilateral negotiations as a diplomatic means of enhancing both countries' national security at a time when tensions were high, when there were conflicts of interests and outright armed conflict between proxies of the two nations across the globe. The motivations for SALT were complex and for the US varied a great deal amongst the various political actors and bureaucracies. However, it is clear that the massive Soviet build-up of the 1960s brought the two nations to a situation where there was for all practical purposes parity in strategic nuclear weapons, and the US sought to enhance strategic stability in order to prevent an all-out nuclear war, as well as to lower the costs associated with preparing for war.

Certainly there were a number of significant bilateral and multilateral negotiations between the US and the USSR during this period, and between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact communities. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976 resulted in important limitations on biological and nuclear weapons and weapons testing. In addition, negotiations began on conventional forces, including the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe and on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, the focus during this period was on bilateral negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union. Hence, this chapter will focus on the SALT and ABM negotiations that were the centerpiece of strategic arms control during the period from 1968 to 1980. It will delve into the dynamics of the US interagency process through a detailed analysis of the negotiation process—between the two countries, as well as amongst the US agencies. It will pay particular attention to the Department of Defense (DOD) strategies, positions, and influence during the arms talks, and will conclude with comments on the implications of the SALT and ABM agreements.

SALT I AND ABM TREATIES (1969 TO 1972)

The Context of Negotiations

In 1968 at the ceremonial signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the US and the USSR announced their intent to begin bilateral strategic arms limitations talks. The impetus for talks was two-fold. First, the Soviet build-up of strategic weapons had led to a situation of nuclear parity between the two great powers. The two sides felt “a mutual need to solemnize the parity principle . . . to establish an acceptance by each side of the other’s ability to inflict unacceptable retribution in response to a nuclear attack.”¹ Second, as Johnson had noted publicly in January 1967, the Soviets had begun construction of a limited anti-missile defense around Moscow,² to which his administration reluctantly responded by announcing that September that the US intended to deploy the “Sentinel” light ABM system, although officially it was a defense against the emerging Chinese ballistic missile threat. It was apparent that, without some form of negotiated limitations, both the Soviets and the Americans would confront the very real potential for an offensive and defensive arms race. However, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and Richard Nixon’s election that November delayed the beginning of talks.

The focus of arms control shifted under the Nixon Administration. Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger saw arms control as a political tool to be used to open an “era of negotiation” with the Soviet Union, as well as to win points with the American public.³ Although the Soviets contacted Nixon on the day of his inauguration in January 1969, indicating their interest in beginning strategic arms limitations talks, Nixon and Kissinger deferred any decision for several months during which the National Security Council led a review of US strategic nuclear forces and doctrine.⁴ The delay was certainly warranted as the new president confronted a complex set of national security concerns. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird noted that “The first major task before us was Vietnam—a war with no end in sight.”⁵ Writing at the end of his term in 1973, he noted that Vietnam had overshadowed other national security challenges and an environment that was dominated by four realities:

The strategic reality of growing Soviet momentum across the broad spectrum of military strength taking them from a position of clear inferiority in the early 1960’s to virtual strategic nuclear parity [in 1973]. The fiscal reality involving not only the heavy pressure in Congress for

reduced defense spending, but upward pressures of inflation on the cost of everything we need to maintain adequate military forces. The manpower reality, reflecting little understood people costs. . . . It cost us in FY 1973 [with the end of the draft] some \$230 billion more than it did in 1964 for some 133,000 fewer people. The political reality, complicating severely the other three realities from the standpoint of: the political and psychological effects of Soviet policy and growing presence around the world, such as in the Mediterranean and the Middle East; pressures from our allies to maintain forward deployed United States forces; congressional pressures to reduce those forces; or gaining broad political support here at home for doing all the things we have to do to assure our national security interests while continuing to reorder our national priorities.⁶

By any standard the strategic environment that Nixon faced from 1969 to 1972 was a challenging one. Internationally, the Soviet Union was now the equal of the US in terms of nuclear weapons, and Moscow's conventional forces and the proxies it armed were increasingly active around the globe. US relations with its NATO allies were somewhat strained as West Germany's policy of "Ostpolitik" challenged US control over East-West relations. China was emerging as a potential nuclear threat. Above all, the US had 550,000 troops mired in Vietnam, and there were no signs of victory on the horizon. At the same time, domestically the opposition to the Vietnam War led to a credibility gap of the military, and there were calls for the end of the draft. Budget deficits, inflation, and an unpopular war were leading Congress to call for unilateral cuts in US troops in Europe, and cuts in the overall defense budget.

The first year of the Nixon Administration was used to review these and other challenges. The "Nixon Doctrine" and the implementing strategy of "Realistic Deterrence" that resulted from that review set forth a new direction for US foreign policy and a new national security strategy. Seeking to reconcile the increasing international challenges with decreasing domestic support and resources, Nixon's aim was to "seek world stability through a more equitable sharing of the responsibilities for deterrence with our allies."⁷ It sought "peace through partnership with out allies" with increased foreign assistance and decreased emphasis on the use of US troops, and promised a nuclear shield "for any nation whose survival we judge to be vital to our own security," while "harmonizing" doctrine and capability with a 1-1/2 war strategy "adequate for simultaneously meeting a

major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting Allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.”⁸ Laird noted that the new strategy also included “a willingness to negotiate” in an attempt to seek strategic “sufficiency through mutual agreement and restraint rather than through unbounded competition.”⁹

Ultimately, arms control negotiations made sense for many reasons, not the least of those being the DOD’s assessment of the continuing rapid expansion of Soviet strategic offensive capabilities. A brief look at the balance of US and Soviet strategic forces, as covered in the 1971 Secretary of Defense’s report to Congress is instructive.¹⁰ He noted that the Soviets had 1,110 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers to the US’s 1,054, with more than 275 launchers for the large SS-9, and a projection of over 1,250 operational ICBMs on launchers by mid-1970—compared to 250 ICBM launchers in 1966. The US had 41 POLARIS submarines; the Soviets were projected to have from 35 to 50 equivalent “Y” Class submarines by 1974-75. Only in the heavy bomber leg of the triad would the US hold an advantage for the foreseeable future—about 200 for the USSR, over 500 for the US. Furthermore, the Soviets were proceeding with their Moscow-based ABM system.

It was not surprising, given the strategic environment and the domestic support for arms limitations, that Nixon and Kissinger decided in June 1969 to proceed on arms control talks with the Soviets, and after a few months of Soviet delay, preliminary talks began in Vienna in November 1969.

US and Soviet Objectives for SALT I/ABM Negotiations

It is not an easy task to state decisively what the objectives of the two sides were going into negotiations. First, the Soviet system precluded a clear insight into the motivations of the Soviet leadership. Second, even on the American side, there were numerous, and sometimes conflicting, objectives held by the various bureaucracies and their chief participants in the front-line and behind-the-scenes aspects of the negotiations. The following discussion will attempt to present the broad objectives of both. While there were tensions amongst the different US agencies about the objectives of SALT, those will be discussed later under interagency debates during the negotiations.¹¹

Nixon’s handwritten notes on the cover of a recently declassified Top Secret Sentinel ABM system memo from March 1969 show that he was greatly concerned about the continued Soviet offensive strategic build-up. He wrote: “1) They have closed the gap; 2) They continue to increase; 3) They want to talk; 4) We must see that the gap is not widened on other

side.”¹² Nixon saw SALT as a means to address his concerns. In his memoir *The Real War*, President Nixon laid out his three primary goals for SALT in 1969. First, he saw long-term, equitable arms control limitations agreements as a means to enhancing strategic stability with lower arms expenditures. He noted that Congress was not receptive to increasing strategic force expenditures, as evidenced by the Senate’s passage of the “Safeguard” ABM program by one vote. Second, Nixon saw SALT as a means of buying time, while testing the Soviets’ intentions regarding arms limitations; if they showed themselves not to be serious, that would provide him with evidence he could use to get congressional support for boosting strategic programs. Third, he saw the possibility of moderating the Soviet build-up and of a new era of improved relations, characterized by cooperation and negotiation rather than conflict—essentially a period of détente, rather than of military competition. However, by 1971 he had lowered his goals for SALT due to the Soviet’s continued strategic build-up. At that time he focused on obtaining offensive limitations that would halt the growth of Soviet ICBM launchers.¹³

A crucial aspect of Nixon’s (and Kissinger’s) approach was the linkage of political and military issues, as well as the linkage between US-Soviet relations in different parts of the world. Kissinger quotes a Nixon memo (that Kissinger himself had drafted) in his *White House Years* memoir:

I am convinced that the great issues are fundamentally interrelated. I do not mean this to establish artificial linkages between specific elements of one or another issue or between tactical steps that we may elect to take. But I do believe that crisis or confrontation in one place and real cooperation in another cannot long be sustained simultaneously. . . . I believe that the Soviet leaders should be brought to understand that they cannot expect to reap the benefits of cooperation in one area while seeking to take advantage of tension or confrontation elsewhere.¹⁴

Nixon and Kissinger were determined that the Soviets would not get a SALT agreement without some consideration on other issues of import to the US. In particular, Nixon and Kissinger were interested in achieving Soviet cooperation on Vietnam in return for US participation in arms control negotiations.¹⁵ This would provide a bonus for Nixon’s domestic political popularity as well, helping to soften Nixon’s image as a “warmonger.”¹⁶

The Soviet leaders’ objectives for SALT were much less readily discernible. In fact it was only during the first round of preliminary talks,

five weeks in Helsinki in November and December 1969, that the Americans got a sense of the Soviet's major objectives. The State Department's "executive officer" for the SALT delegation, Raymond Garthoff, noted the surprise of the American team at that first set of meetings when the Soviets indicated their desire to limit ABM deployments geographically and numerically—not even excluding the possibility of a complete ban on ABMs.¹⁷ The ABM proposal was significant because it heralded a change of Soviet doctrine, indicating their acceptance of the logic of mutual assured destruction that recognized defensive forces as a potential threat to peace.¹⁸ A second Soviet objective was to include all weapons capable of nuclear attack on the territories of the Soviet Union and the United States in the strategic offensive arms talks, i.e. NATO forward-based systems (FBS). A noteworthy omission was the issue of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) limitations, although Garthoff noted that in later informal discussions the Soviets indicated surprise that the Americans had not brought up the issue of MIRVs.¹⁹

In his book, Chief SALT Negotiator Gerard Smith attributed additional political and security-related motivations to the Soviets' interest in negotiations. First, the Soviets wanted to be formally recognized as a strategic equal, and hence a political equal. That is corroborated by a Soviet commentator who said that the recognition of parity between the US and the Soviets was "the very essence" of the SALT agreements.²⁰ Second, like the US the USSR was interested in diverting resources from military spending to civilian needs, and hence wanted to avoid a strategic arms race. Lastly, Smith believed that the Soviets saw China as the biggest security threat and they wanted to free up resources and energy to focus on that threat on their eastern front.²¹ In addition, although Smith did not discuss it, some thought the Soviets wanted to use SALT to drive a wedge between the US and its NATO allies.²²

SALT I/ABM: Interagency Negotiations

In order to understand how the SALT I and ABM treaties were negotiated, it is essential to understand the negotiating process—the two separate channels in which negotiations took place—and the extraordinary influence that one man, Henry Kissinger, exercised in those negotiations. In fact, Nixon saw to it that Kissinger exercised unprecedented authority over the entire national security policymaking apparatus. As the president's National Security Advisor, Kissinger directed government agencies—such as State, Defense, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)—to prepare studies on various policy

proposals. Kissinger chaired the National Security Council (NSC), and the NSC Review Group that gave him the authority to approve departmental proposals before they reached the president. Kissinger also chaired the Verification Panel that had direct responsibility for all SALT issues.²³ As Kissinger put it to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, “Only two people can answer precisely at any given moment the position of the USA on this or that question: these are President Nixon and Kissinger.”²⁴

It is important to recognize that while Kissinger exercised an inordinate amount of influence on the SALT negotiations, he was still constrained by the realities of domestic politics. The congressional push for defense spending cuts, its opposition to certain programs and support of others, and its clamor for some type of arms control agreement, as well as the views of different executive agencies certainly limited what the US could propose in negotiations—and the Soviets knew that. In particular, Kissinger makes it clear in his analysis of the negotiations that the views and concerns of the military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Department of Defense (DOD), were paramount in his development and analysis of various negotiation proposals.²⁵ If the Joint Chiefs spoke out against the ratification of any SALT treaty, it would never make it through the Senate. When Secretary of Defense Laird advocated continuing the development of ABM technology in case of “treaty breakout” by the Soviets, there were obviously going to be limits on what Kissinger could negotiate.²⁶

Finally, it should be recognized that the various agencies’ different positions on SALT issues were largely a result of the natural differences in philosophies and worldviews prevalent within the agencies. For instance, the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency personnel tended to place more trust in the Soviets, tended to favor a “show of good faith,” and saw arms control as an ends in and of itself—opposing the Nixon/Kissinger policy of linkage, which saw arms control as a means of gaining political leverage. Ambassador Gerard Smith, director of ACDA and chief negotiator for the US SALT delegation, represented the ACDA and State Department thinking about the goals of SALT. In his book *Doubletalk*, Smith said that:

in this nuclear age, when rival nations live under the threat of almost instant destruction, a chance to reduce that threat has independent value. Adversary nations should grasp any such opportunity even though their other relations are not improving.²⁷

Smith favored a ban on ABMs and a moratorium on MIRV testing, and sought a quick start to negotiations, before a MIRV testing ban would be too

late. He noted in a letter to Secretary of State Rogers that it would be better in the long run to keep MIRVs out of both countries' arsenals because it would bring increased instability, and he saw the weak effort to ban MIRVs as "the leading lost opportunity" of the negotiations.²⁸ ACDA and the State Department preferred a broad SALT agreement, sharing the doctrine that deterrence, rather than defense, was the rational strategic policy that the US should pursue.²⁹

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the JCS, and the NSC, on the other hand, tended to be more skeptical about the Soviet's motives and preferred to negotiate from a position of strength. They did not want to lose access to new technology—such as MIRVs or futuristic ABM technology, and sought to minimize constraints. Ambassador Smith believed that Secretary of Defense Laird's primary concern was to use the negotiations as an opportunity to make Americans aware of the Soviet strategic build-up and, thereby, to put pressure on Congress to fund strategic programs.³⁰ As Smith put it, "Nothing concentrated the minds of American leaders on the advantages of SALT as much as the clear and present danger of one-sided arms control in the form of congressional cuts in US defense budgets."³¹ On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were, according to Smith, generally supportive of SALT, probably due to the lack of utility of additional offensive launchers, unless widespread ABM defensive systems were deployed.³²

Perhaps the one area of agreement going into the SALT negotiations—amongst the US agencies, as well as between the US and Soviet teams—was that any arms control agreement had to be verifiable by "national technical means" (NTMs) such as satellites and radar systems.

The SALT negotiations officially opened in Vienna in April of 1970. In the four months since the preliminary talks with the Soviet team in Helsinki, the US team had focused in on four options developed by the NSC Verification Panel.³³

Option A: Limit ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to current US total of 1,170; freeze strategic bombers at 527 US to 195 USSR; ABM at Safeguard level of 12 sites.

Option B: Same offensive limits as Option A. ABM limited to protection of the National Command Authority (NCA) or banned ABM.

Option C: Same offensive limits as Option A. Ban on MIRVs provided the Soviets agree to on-site inspection. ABM: NCA or banned.

Option D: Major offensive cuts in ICBMs and SLBMs, from 1,710 reduce 100 per year until both sides reached a level of 1,000 by 1978. ABM: NCA or banned. No ban on MIRVs.

The problem, of course, was getting agreement on one of these options. Kissinger and Garthoff noted the following breakout in agency support for the different options:³⁴

Option A: Preferred option of OSD and JCS

Option B: NSC (Kissinger) preferred position, but wanted Safeguard ABM

Option C: ACDA and State preferred option

Option D: ACDA and OSD 2nd choice

As the chair of the Verification Panel, Kissinger took the group's recommendations to Nixon. However, while Kissinger favored Option B, he recommended C and D as the US opening positions:

This would respond to Congressional and bureaucratic supporters of MIRV and ABM bans; it would give us the positive public posture of having favored comprehensive limitations. If the Soviets accepted the proposals, we would have made a major step forward. If the Soviets rejected them, as I firmly expected, we could then put forward Option B from a much stronger domestic and bureaucratic position. If the Soviets surprised us by accepting our offer, the result would be compatible with our security.³⁵

When it was down to the choice of Option C or Option D, Garthoff noted that State and ACDA both favored Option C with its NCA or zero ABM, a freeze on offensive missiles, and a ban on deployment of MIRVs. The DOD favored Option D, because it did not call for limiting MIRVs, although he notes the JCS did not agree with the NCA or zero ABM proposal. Finally, Garthoff noted Kissinger's intention that neither C nor D would be accepted, and that Kissinger had added provisions for on-site verification for the MIRV ban and unilateral cuts for Soviet offensive missiles, but none for the US.³⁶

US-Soviet Negotiations on SALT I/ABM

The top priority of the United States in the SALT negotiations was to limit Soviet offensive weapons in order to assure (or at least enhance) the survivability of the Minuteman ICBMs. The Soviet's top priority was to conclude an ABM treaty that banned the ABM or limited ABMs to NCA protection. The US was determined *not* to conclude any treaty on defensive limitations without a concurrent agreement on offensive arms limits. Furthermore, the US was determined not to count US forward-based nuclear systems (FBS), primarily aircraft based in Europe and carrier forces, in any offensive limits, seeing any such agreement as a threat to our allies' perception of our commitment to NATO. The Soviets sought offensive limits that would count all US FBS and heavy bombers, seeing any weapon that could reach the USSR as a strategic threat. And while the US wanted to put qualitative limits on strategic launchers in order to prevent the Soviets from jeopardizing Minuteman survivability with heavy missiles, the Soviets wanted to avoid any qualitative limitations on their missiles since they were developing new ICBMs and SLBMs at the time.

Given the disparate and conflicting objectives of the two countries, it is not surprising that it took over two years of negotiations to come to an agreement. From the very beginning there were several issues that would require significant compromise in order to come to any agreement. Three major areas of disagreement involved MIRV limitations, ABM limitations, and what systems were to be covered by the treaty—particularly FBS, SLBMs, and modernized ICBMs.

MIRV Limitations

From the first months of the Nixon Administration task forces had been developing studies of what could and what should be accomplished under the auspices of SALT. The issue of the new MIRV technology was a major consideration. In fact, out of nine options that came out of those initial studies, four favored a ban on MIRVs.³⁷ The State Department (under Secretary of State Rogers) and ACDA (under Ambassador Smith) urged the Nixon Administration to push ahead with SALT earlier, rather than later, partly due to their concern that talks begin before the US completed the testing of the MIRV, which would make it all but impossible to negotiate a MIRV ban under SALT.³⁸ Indeed, an April 9, 1970 Senate resolution urged President Nixon to propose the immediate suspension of development on all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons, and Senator Muskie advocated and "interim strategic standstill" that included an end to MIRV

flight testing.³⁹ The reason was that a MIRV ban would only be readily verifiable using national technical means (NTMs) if it involved a ban on the testing, and such a ban would only be effective before testing was complete. Once either side was ready to deploy, NTMs would not be sufficient for verification.

How was it that only one of the four options considered by Nixon prior to the beginning of negotiations in Vienna in May 1970 included any limitations on MIRV, and even that offer was tied to a stipulation that any MIRV ban require on-site verification? The answer, according to Kissinger and State Department SALT delegation member Raymond Garthoff, is that the OSD and the JCS were “passionately in favor of MIRV,” and Secretary of Defense Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, and General Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS demanded on-site verification of any MIRV limitation.⁴⁰ Garthoff notes that the JCS and OSD were, above all, protective of the imminent American deployment of MIRV. Kissinger remarked that civilian and military defense officials were counting on MIRV to counter the increases in Soviet offensive missile launchers, as well as to penetrate a Soviet ABM system.⁴¹ Ultimately, Kissinger felt he had little recourse, because he needed the political support of the Pentagon and the Pentagon’s conservative congressional allies, and that could only be had if MIRV limits were avoided.⁴²

In fact, the issue of on-site verification that accompanied the MIRV ban is instructive in that it demonstrates how some offers were made to the Soviets solely for political purposes, rather than for serious consideration. Both Smith and Garthoff discuss at some length how even the CIA deemed on-site inspections for a ban on flight testing of MIRV to be unnecessary—or even undesirable from a national security perspective—but that the requirement was added by Nixon and Kissinger after the NSC Verification Panel reviewed the final four options, in order to placate the JCS and the OSD.⁴³ In fact, the military representatives had indicated during NSC meetings that they saw the on-site inspection requirement as a means of ensuring the Soviets would not accept a MIRV ban.⁴⁴ They were correct. Garthoff noted how his counterpart on the Soviet delegation had been busily taking notes on the US proposal to ban MIRVs, but that he “simply put down his pen after the on-site inspection provision was read.”⁴⁵ In short, the Pentagon did not want a ban on MIRV; so MIRV was, for all practical purposes, never “on the table.”

FBS, SLBMs, and Missile Modernization

Two major disagreements plagued the SALT negotiations from the beginning. First, the Soviets insisted that any limitations on offensive strategic arms count the forward based systems—US bombers and aircraft carriers based in the European theater whose missiles could reach Soviet territory. Second, the US insisted that there could be no agreement on defensive limitations without a concurrent agreement on offensive limitations. While ACDA and the State Department would have favored some concessions to the Soviet concern about the “strategic” nature of FBS, the White House would not and could not do so, due to the trouble it would have caused with our NATO allies and with the Joint Chiefs.⁴⁶ As Kissinger stated in a congressional briefing in June 1971:

The Soviets believed that strategic means any weapons system capable of reaching the Soviet Union or the United States. This would have included our forward-based aircraft and carrier forces, but excluded Soviet intermediate-range rockets aimed at Europe and other areas. We opposed this approach since it would have prejudiced our alliance commitments and raised a distinction between our own security and that of our European allies.⁴⁷

Gerard Smith noted that a “breakthrough” occurred in May 1971 when Kissinger accepted the Soviet proposal to conclude ABM limitations in conjunction with an interim agreement to freeze offensive missile launchers, rather than concluding a comprehensive defensive and offensive arms limitation agreement.⁴⁸ However, given the recent Soviet build-up, the freeze would mean a Soviet advantage in both ICBM and SLBM missile launchers. The agreement was concluded in the “back channel” negotiations between Kissinger and Dobrynin, however, and apparently Kissinger had inadvertently indicated to Dobrynin that the freeze might or might not include SLBMs—a significant oversight that both Smith and Garthoff indicated was to cost much time and effort to correct.⁴⁹ It was a crucial oversight. Apparently Kissinger was concentrating on the Pentagon’s and Congress’s concern with the Soviet ICBM buildup, and was ignorant of the fact that the US did not have the programs or capacity to construct or deploy additional SLBM-carrying submarines for several years.⁵⁰ During the following months, when the SALT delegation attempted to reincorporate SLBMs into the offensive arms freeze, the Soviets replayed their “then you must count FBS” card.⁵¹ In the end, Kissinger was only able to achieve a

SLBM “breakthrough” in April 1972, by allowing the Soviets what Garthoff and Smith considered to be an overly generous number of submarines and SLBMs under the “freeze,” selling the Soviets the inclusion of the SLBMs only because the high numbers would not interfere with their continued SLBM buildup.⁵² Furthermore, Kissinger’s agreement violated the US principle of not including FBS, since that would count both British and French submarines in the agreement. Based on absolute worst-case CIA projections, Kissinger was able to convince JCS Chairman Admiral Moorer that the 950 SLBM/62 submarines limit was, in fact, a limitation; although Kissinger’s pressure on Moorer and Secretary of Defense Laird to support the SALT SLBM limits in return for White House support for an accelerated Trident SSBN-SLBM program was undoubtedly also influential.⁵³ ACDA’s Smith and Secretary of State Rogers argued that it would be better to drop the SLBM freeze.⁵⁴

Another issue related to freeze limits negotiated by Kissinger in the back channels that was left to be worked out by the SALT negotiation team involved Kissinger’s agreement that within the numerical limits of the freeze on ICBMs and modern large ICBMs (like the SS-9) there would be no limitations on modernization or replacement of missiles or missile launchers. However, in order to achieve verifiable limits on heavy ICBMs, the US needed to get constraints on modernization. Specifically, there needed to be a limit on the increases in the size of silos undergoing modernization, as well as a definition of what constituted a “large” or “heavy” missile. In the end, the US succeeded at neither task, relying instead on a vague agreement that ICBM silo size could not be “significantly increased,” and never achieving a definition of what constituted a “heavy” missile, or any agreement on limiting changes in missile volume, leaving those definitions for the SALT II negotiators to work out.⁵⁵

Implications of SALT I and ABM Treaties

The SALT I and ABM treaties have had their critics. To some it seemed that the unequal numbers frozen in the interim agreement were a threat to US security, and that the US negotiators had given up too much for too little. For others, the US wasted an opportunity to ban a costly and dangerous new technology when it failed to include restrictions or a complete ban on MIRV technology. However, considering the various agencies that ultimately supported the treaties, as well as their successful ratification by the Senate, there were clearly significant benefits associated directly and indirectly with these first arms limitations. While the freeze on

offensive ballistic missile launchers did not appreciably limit the damages if war were to occur, the ABM and SALT I treaties did have significant benefits in terms of minimizing the likelihood of war between the two superpowers, and it may have had some effect in terms of reducing the costs of preparing for war.

As the first bilateral negotiations on arms limitations between the two superpowers, the SALT treaties were both a success and a failure. State Department SALT delegate and scholar Raymond Garthoff made the following assessment of the agreements:

The SALT I agreements of 1972 constituted a substantial step in strategic arms control, although an incomplete one owing to the weak constraints involved in the interim freeze on strategic offensive missiles and the unresolved differences on the whole complex of offensive systems. . . . It also served the mundane aims of halting the Soviet buildup of ICBM launchers without constraining the U.S. buildup of MIRV.⁵⁶

Certainly SALT placed an upper limit on the up-till-then massive Soviet buildup of offensive strategic weapons launchers, and the ABM Treaty prevented an arms race fueled by a buildup of anti-ballistic missile defense systems. Due to the efforts of the American negotiating team, the ABM limitations also extended to futuristic technologies, further reducing the threat that defensive systems might lead to spiraling costs for offensive arms to counter them. So, there were almost certainly some savings in military spending realized by both sides.

However, Garthoff, Kissinger, and Ambassador Smith have all remarked on the opportunity lost when the SALT negotiations failed to “keep the genie in the bottle” when it came to MIRV technology. As discussed above, the military was strongly opposed to giving up the MIRV that was seen as essential to balance the overwhelming advantage the Soviets were gaining with their massive ICBM and SLBM programs. Furthermore, the military was understandably reluctant to forego the MIRV before it was certain that the two countries would indeed reach an ABM agreement. The problem was that it was inevitable that the Soviets would also soon develop MIRV technology, which would further exacerbate the strategic imbalance in ICBMs. Even Kissinger admitted as much in a press conference once it was clear that the Soviets were also developing MIRVs saying, “I wish I had thought through the implications of a MIRVed world more thoughtfully in 1969 and 1970 than I did.”⁵⁷ Perhaps, with 20-20

hindsight, it would have been possible to delay the MIRV testing which would have made a MIRV ban possible.

In terms of the negotiation process itself, Smith's and Garthoff's reviews of the SALT negotiations provide some criticisms of back-channel approaches to negotiations. In particular, they note the opportunities for miscommunication, and the distrust that mixed signals engendered—on both Soviet and the US teams. Unfortunately for the US, the Soviet SALT delegation was much better informed about the issues being discussed and the deals being made in the Kissinger back channels, which put the US delegation at a distinct disadvantage and which also reduced the level of trust between the delegation and the White House. Furthermore, some of the “loopholes” and later disagreements regarding potential treaty violations might have been avoided had there been more coordination between the two negotiation tracks, particularly on the American side.⁵⁸

While there has been considerable debate in recent years about the potential for the US unilaterally pulling out of the ABM Treaty in order to work towards a national missile defense system to guard against ballistic missile attacks by “rogue” nations, the ABM Treaty undoubtedly served a valuable purpose during the Cold War. A system of anti-ballistic missile systems—a “thick” defense—would have worked havoc on the strategic doctrine of mutual assured destruction that did provide stability during the Cold War. With the Soviets' shift towards thinking of defensive systems as potentially destabilizing, it was more important than ever to prevent a defensive-offensive weapons arms race from spiraling out of control. In addition, the realities of domestic politics made it unlikely that the US would have been able to field an ABM system, potentially permitting the Soviets to overcome the Americans' temporary advantage in defensive systems. The related agreement of both countries on the necessity to allow national technical means of verification, primarily through satellite and other remote sensing, grew out of the mutual recognition that strategic stability required a certain level of transparency and predictability.

Probably the clearest benefit of the SALT negotiations was the opening up of an era of détente—just as Nixon and Kissinger had hoped. The negotiations were valuable in and of themselves in relaxing the tensions between two adversaries. It was “negotiation as a substitute for confrontation.”⁵⁹ Kissinger said:

In my view SALT was not a cure-all. I saw in it an opportunity to redress the strategic balance but also to create the conditions for political restraint without which escalating crises were in my view inevitable, whatever

happened to SALT. Militarily, SALT would delay the Soviet buildup and thus the ultimate threat to our land-based forces. It could help us preserve the sinews of our defense and to catch up numerically in the face of the stormy dissent produced by Vietnam. SALT could be the process of mutual restraint without which mankind would sooner or later face Armageddon.⁶⁰

SALT II (1972-1979)

The Context of Negotiations

The domestic context of the SALT II negotiations was somewhat less favorable than it had been for SALT I. First, there had been significant congressional dissatisfaction with the inequality of the limits on strategic offensive weapons negotiated under the interim agreement. As a result, while the Senate ratified SALT I, they stipulated in the Jackson Amendment, proposed by Senator “Scoop” Jackson, that any future arms control agreements would only be acceptable if they included equal levels of strategic offensive weapons, signaling that future arms control agreements would face great scrutiny in the Senate. Second, President Nixon’s credibility and influence in foreign policy, including on the SALT II negotiations, were adversely impacted by the Watergate scandal and cover-up that consumed much of the administration’s time and focus. In addition, the public support for détente, as well as the public’s trust that the Soviet Union would abide by negotiated limitations began to waiver in the mid-1970s. However, there was still the impetus for arms control provided by congressional and public desire for reduced defense budgets, as well as by the fact that the Soviet offensive strategic weapons build-up was continuing at an alarming rate. Finally, while the Soviets would have been happy to retain the numerical advantages in launchers permitted under the interim SALT I agreement, the US could not maintain that status quo—particularly as the Soviets began to replace their old ICBMs with new, more accurate, MIRVed ICBMs.

It was difficult to keep up the momentum in the negotiations with Nixon’s resignation and with some of the personnel changes that came with the Ford and Carter Administrations. All three of the presidents during this timeframe—Nixon, Ford, and Carter—were seriously committed to the conclusion of a SALT II agreement. Henry Kissinger remained the “point man” for SALT II, and he continued to dominate the negotiations from 1972 through 1976, first as National Security Advisor (NSA) to Nixon and Ford,

then as both NSA and Secretary of State under Ford. Under the Carter Administration, Secretary of State Vance and ACDA Director Paul Warnke were ostensibly leading the SALT II negotiation effort. However, the different secretaries of defense had a singularly important role in the process, as the following discussion on “Interagency Negotiations” will illustrate.

US-Soviet relations had improved somewhat in the early 1970s as both countries pursued détente, and the US was gained some advantages from the “triangular diplomacy” that exploited the schism between the Soviet and Chinese communists. However, wars by the two superpowers’ proxies continued around the globe, and the Middle East in particular was of grave concern. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger noted in his Fiscal Year (FY) 1976 report to Congress that the Middle East had the potential for turning into the Balkans of 1914, even while the Western powers were tending to look inward to deal with international economic problems that were similar to those that caused such great instability in the 1930s.⁶¹ All of the secretaries of defense during this period warned that the US had to respond to the Soviet’s aggressive military build-up. Schlesinger noted that the Soviets were devoting significantly more resources than the US—20 percent more in research and development; 60 percent more in strategic nuclear offensive forces.⁶² A year later, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted the Soviet military’s concerted, decade-long effort to increase both the quantities and quality of their strategic capabilities. In addition to adding 1,600 ICBMs, 700 SLBMs, and 2,000 warheads and bombs, in 1975 the Soviets were developing four new ICBMs (two of which were MIRVed), they were producing a new generation of Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs, one with a 4,200 mile range), they had improved the accuracy of their ICBMs, they were deploying large MIRVs with high-yield warheads, and they were developing the SS-20 mobile intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM).⁶³

The increase in offensive strategic programs on which Secretary of Defense Laird had predicated his support for the SALT I and ABM treaties continued into the beginning of the Carter Administration. As a counter to the Soviet’s build-up, the Department of Defense (DOD) was working on the Trident SLBM system with new submarines and missiles, the B-1 strategic bomber with Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoys (SCAD) and Short Range Attack Missiles (SRAM), plus air- and sea-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs), and finally the new MX ICBM.⁶⁴ Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted that these programs were essential to achieve four basic objectives for the US strategic nuclear forces: a second-strike capability; a flexible nuclear response; essential equivalence in order to

maintain strategic nuclear balance; and stability in strategic nuclear competition that would forsake a disarming first-strike capability and that sought to achieve equitable arms control agreements.⁶⁵

US and Soviet Objectives for SALT II

As mentioned above, there was naturally somewhat of a gap between the two countries' levels of motivation for the quick conclusion of a treaty that would, in accordance with the Jackson Amendment, have to provide for equal levels of strategic offensive arms. The Soviets had a five-year numerical advantage in strategic missile launchers to lose, and any agreement to limit the numbers of ICBM or SLBM launchers would force much more significant cuts on the USSR given its military buildup. In fact, from the course of negotiations it appears that the Soviets were generally quite happy with the relatively minor limitations to their offensive buildup under the Interim Agreement, and that their objectives were primarily to retain as much of an advantage in their offensive capability as possible, at the same time as they restricted US technological advantages, such as the cruise missile and bombers which were not counted under SALT I limitations. They were also interested in getting the US forward-based nuclear systems in Europe counted in any offensive weapons limits. Additionally, they were concerned about our NATO allies, Germany in particular, getting access to US cruise missile technology. Nixon's assessment in his memoirs was that the Soviets objective during the SALT II negotiations was to develop and maintain a first-strike capability against the US ICBMs; the US could not, according to Nixon, succeed in achieving its objectives because the US had nothing to bargain with.⁶⁶ In Nixon's eyes, the Soviets did not seek equality or equivalency, they sought to prepare to win a nuclear war that they believed was quite possible, undesirable as that might be.⁶⁷ The "histrionic lengths" that the Soviets went to in refusing to consider any proposal to roll back the limit of 308 heavy ICBMs, to avoid any limits on their MIRVed modern large ballistic missiles (MLBMs), and their hostile reaction to President Carter's "deep cuts" would seem to support Nixon's conclusion.⁶⁸

It could be that the Soviets only participated in the SALT II negotiations because they were obligated to after their conclusion of SALT I. However, it is also possible that they actually sought to enhance strategic stability and to avoid a nuclear conflict; President Ford was impressed with Brezhnev's sincere desire to avoid a third world war when the two negotiated at Vladivostok.⁶⁹ During the Carter Administration, Brezhnev was also working hard at reducing barriers to trade with the US, and for that

cooperation on SALT II was as much of a necessity as the USSR respect for human rights.⁷⁰ In a sense, the Soviets wanted the economic benefits of détente under SALT II negotiations as much as the Nixon and Kissinger sought the political benefits of détente under the SALT I negotiations.

The US objectives for SALT II were much more focused than they had been under the previous set of negotiations. Throughout the SALT II negotiations the basic US goal was to preserve strategic stability; to deter a nuclear war with the Soviet Union by ensuring a second strike capability. The challenge was to achieve “parity” given the two adversaries’ different mixes of strategic weapons and the need for verification of qualitative restrictions. The Soviet testing of their MIRVed MLBMs in the summer of 1973 made it clear that one rationale Nixon had used to sell SALT I to Congress—the US superiority in the number of warheads—would not apply for long. The USSR would have more ICBMs, it would have MIRVed ICBMs, and among those would be 308 heavy missiles that could be MIRVed.⁷¹ Nixon stated that at the beginning of the SALT II negotiations:

our objective was to redress the inequalities that had been accepted by necessity in SALT I, and particularly to obtain reductions in the massive 4-1 throw weight advantage that had been permitted the Soviets. Our concern was that the Soviets would be able to convert their throw weight by the middle 1980s into a disarming first-strike option against our land-based ICBMs, our submarines in port, and our bombers on the ground. In such a situation the United States would have no response available except for the completely illogical and suicidal response of attacking Soviet cities with our small remaining force, inviting a massive, certain Soviet retaliation upon our own cities.⁷²

In short, the US was still concerned about the vulnerability of its Minuteman ICBM force.

There was one notable, if relatively short-lived, shift in US objectives for SALT II. Shortly after he became president in 1977, Carter proposed a much grander scope for SALT II, particularly given the Vladivostok Accord of November 1974. According to Leslie Gelb, the State Department’s main voice on arms control under Secretary of State Vance, arms control was Carter’s highest priority at the beginning of his administration, and Carter wanted “to go beyond what President Ford and Henry Kissinger had done and to have truly deep cuts in nuclear weapons—not marginal cuts, but deep cuts, to really end the nuclear competition.”⁷³ However, that objective ran

directly counter to what the Soviets sought from SALT II, and the Carter team backed down from their more ambitious goals.

SALT II: Interagency Negotiations

Henry Kissinger was still very much the central figure for the first few years of SALT II negotiations, from November 1972 through 1976. However, his control over the US agenda began to wane when President Ford relieved him of his position as National Security Advisor (NSA) as part of the “October Massacre” of 1975 that saw Donald Rumsfeld replace James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense, and Kissinger’s former deputy Brent Scowcroft take over as NSA. Kissinger still had the helm of the State Department that he had taken over in August 1973 after William Rogers resigned, and he continued to run the back-channel negotiations;⁷⁴ however, as a Ford speechwriter put it, “Kissinger no longer got to play God during his daily one-hour meeting with the president.”⁷⁵ With Kissinger’s institutional advantage over the other cabinet members neutralized, the close personal relations between Ford and his former chief of staff, Donald Rumsfeld, allowed the new secretary of defense to play a stronger role in the development of the Ford Administration’s SALT II negotiating positions. A few months after Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense his doubt that the Soviets ever intended to accept strategic equality, and his hesitancy to move ahead with a strategy that did not have political and bureaucratic support were instrumental in Ford’s decision to give up on achieving a SALT II agreement during his term by early 1976.⁷⁶

The lines of interagency dispute shifted somewhat during the Ford Administration. As had been the case for Nixon, Ford recognized that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs held a “trump card,” in that the loss of support from any of them would likely end the chances of Senate ratification of any agreement.⁷⁷ However, ACDA Director Fred Ikle tended to side with Defense and the CIA, expressing reservations about Kissinger’s negotiations, breaking the old alliance that had existed between State and ACDA.⁷⁸ Rumsfeld, the Joint Chiefs, and Ikle blocked Kissinger’s Ford-approved proposal for a compromise that limited cruise missiles in exchange for Soviet constraints on the Backfire bomber—the two major outstanding issues that prevented an agreement based on the Vladivostok Accord from being reached in 1976.⁷⁹

During the Carter Administration it was again the Secretary of Defense, now Harold Brown, who “quickly established himself as the single most influential SALT policy-maker in the new administration aside from the President himself.”⁸⁰ Brown had been a member of and consultant to the

SALT negotiation teams under both the Nixon and Ford Administrations, and he and his deputy both favored more ambitious goals than Kissinger had been willing to attempt.⁸¹ Brown's influence was partly attributable to his position, for Carter, too, recognized that he needed the support of the Defense Department and the JCS in order to have a chance at gaining Senate approval of SALT II.⁸² However, Brown also gained clout due to his considerable government experience, and his bold manner, and perhaps also due to the fact that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was extremely busy with other foreign policy.

There were two general issues that were a source of interagency (and personal) rivalry from the first days of the Carter Administration. The first concerned whether or not there would be a Kissinger-type "linkage" between the SALT II negotiations and broader US-Soviet relations. The second concerned the scope of negotiations; would Carter continue along the lines of Ford and Kissinger, or would he seek to propose more radical reductions. Vance's influence on Carter's arms control negotiations approach and US-Soviet relations in general was challenged by the president's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, as well as by Brown. While early on Carter eschewed a policy of linking arms control with broader Soviet-US relations, he ultimately ended up doing just that. Brzezinski notes that a sharp division developed between he, Secretary Brown, and the Joint Chiefs on one hand, and Secretary Vance and ACDA director Paul Warnke on the other hand when it came to the issue of "linkage."⁸³ Brzezinski wanted Carter and Vance to avoid emphasizing SALT so heavily, without some reduction in the USSR's interventionism around the globe, while Vance (and Carter at first) initially sought to use SALT as an opening for improved relations. Brzezinski called for "a firmer response and a more direct sustained dialogue with the Soviets on what was and was not acceptable."⁸⁴ Domestic political realities ultimately dictated linkage, for as Brzezinski had opined, without "comprehensive and reciprocal détente," SALT II would never be ratified, and Carter explicitly imposed linkages between SALT negotiations and Soviet-sponsored revolutions in Africa.⁸⁵

The second major issue arose in developing the administration's opening move for the SALT II negotiations. Carter had come into office with a vision of eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth, but the fact was that the US and USSR were not too far apart on an agreement based on the accord reached by Ford and Brezhnev in Vladivostok and subsequent Kissinger-Dobrynin meetings. Vance and ACDA Director Warnke favored the quick conclusion of an agreement based on Vladivostok, but Brzezinski and Brown favored "deep cuts." Brown and

Brzezinski sought an agreement that would reduce overall levels of strategic weapons, especially of ICBMs and MIRVs that threatened the survivability of US ICBMs, while Vance saw the diplomatic drawbacks of an overly ambitious agenda.⁸⁶

The cruise missile and Backfire bomber issues were to plague the SALT II negotiations up until the very end—in both the US interagency process and US-Soviet negotiations. During the Ford-Kissinger era, the Pentagon had made it clear that they wanted the Backfire counted as a strategic weapon system, as a “heavy” bomber, because if the Soviets were to develop refueling support capability, the Backfire would have intercontinental range. However, Kissinger did not believe it should count in the ceiling for strategic launchers and in his back-channel negotiations with the USSR, he made that “concession,” believing he could override the Pentagon’s position.⁸⁷ He was wrong. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General George Brown forced Kissinger to back down, rather gracelessly given that Kissinger had already briefed the press on that facet of his negotiations.⁸⁸ Carter and Vance had similar difficulties. While State favored the Soviet proposal to exclude the Backfire from the 2,400 ceiling of delivery systems, the JCS were determined to count it as a strategic weapon, and the Defense Department urged a trade-off between the Backfire and the US ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs).⁸⁹ As the following section on key issues in the US-USSR negotiations will discuss, the Backfire issue was only finally resolved between Carter and Brezhnev the day the treaty was signed two and a half years later.

The second very challenging issue for SALT II negotiations involved developing US cruise missile technology. When Kissinger and Ford met with the Soviets in Vladivostok in November 1974, they thought they had all but wrapped up the negotiations. However, in preparing the record of the summit meeting, the “aide memoire,” the Soviets brought up the issue of air-launched cruise missiles, even though cruise missiles had not been discussed at the summit. They wanted the record to specify that the 2,400 ceiling on strategic delivery systems would include “air-to-surface missiles,” while the US had only been discussing *ballistic* missiles, not *cruise* missiles.⁹⁰ Despite the fervent protestations of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, Kissinger and Ford agreed to include the more general term “air-to-surface missiles.” This led to problems in later years as the Air Force and the Navy began to see a bigger role for cruise missiles, and wanted to undo the “concession” made at Vladivostok.

Cruise missiles remained a major issue throughout the negotiations during the Carter Administration as well. In the interagency negotiations in

which the comprehensive proposal presented to the Soviets in March 1977 was developed, there was significant disagreement on limits for cruise missile range. The Secretary of Defense's office (OSD) proposed a 2,500 km limit for ALCMs, with stricter limits for GLCMs and SLCMs, which Vance supported, while the NSC and ACDA proposed a 1,500 km limit for all cruise missiles.⁹¹ The JCS actually supported the lower limit, but with an ulterior motive. According to a JCS officer, they "figured that a 1,500-kilometer limit on ALCMs was sure-fire insurance that we would get the B-1, because without the B-1 the limit made no sense."⁹² When Secretary of Defense Brown, with Carter's support, cancelled the B-1 program in 1977, it was a shock to the US delegation in Vienna and the JCS, both of whom had been counting on the B-1.⁹³ The result was that the issue of range had to be revisited, and Brown himself sought to increase the range to 3,000 km, but Vance and Warnke persuaded him that it was too late.⁹⁴

Towards the very end of negotiations, in July 1978, another cruise missile issue cropped up as the delegations got into the fine points related to verification of the agreement—whether missiles with conventional warheads would count against the launcher limits. The DOD and the JCS were adamant on the principle that the SALT agreement should not limit conventional or tactical weapons, particularly as both the Air Force and the Navy began to see more possibilities for conventional cruise missiles.⁹⁵ Indeed, our German allies wanted access to conventional GLCMs, so they were also pushing to exclude them from any agreement. Over the objections of State and ACDA who argued that such a distinction would be unverifiable, Carter agreed to push for the differentiation.⁹⁶ In the final agreement the US and the USSR compromised and counted all long-range cruise missiles as strategic launchers—but only for three years, after which time only ALCMs on long-range bombers would count against the 2,400 launcher limit.

US-Soviet Negotiations

The complexity of the highly technical and myriad intertwined issues involved in SALT II led to the negotiations being drawn out over seven years and three presidential administrations. Nixon, Ford, and Carter all thought early in their administrations that an agreement with the Soviets was imminent. However, the two countries' very different strategic nuclear force structures made agreeing upon "essential equivalency" very difficult. The Soviets concentrated their nuclear warheads overwhelmingly in their ICBM forces as well as in their SLBMs. The US, on the other hand, was not building any new ICBMs, had a lead in SLBMs (during the early

negotiations), and was far ahead in developing cruise missile technology, potentially enhancing the strategic bomber leg of the triad. The negotiations only got more complicated as time went on and each side continued to develop their weapons technology, so that mobile ICBMs, increasingly accurate MIRVs, new ballistic missiles such as the intermediate range SS-20, and the US's improving cruise missile technology all had to be dealt with in the context of the negotiations. Furthermore, the Soviets sought "equal security," which in their eyes required taking into consideration US forward based nuclear systems, as well as our NATO allies' nuclear forces capable of reaching the USSR. At the same time, the US was contending with already strained relations with its NATO allies, and any agreements that could be perceived as divorcing the security interests of the US from those of Western Europe had to be avoided.

SALT II started out as a challenging endeavor. The detailed negotiations required due to qualitative limitations, new technologies, and the complexities of verification meant that SALT II only became more challenging as the years of negotiations dragged on. In order to make sense out of the very complex negotiations that transpired over the seven-year period, the following discussion will examine the major agreements and disagreements between the US and the Soviets at a few critical points in the process—the Ford/Kissinger Vladivostok negotiations of October-November 1974, the Carter/Vance "comprehensive proposal" and "deferral proposal" of March 1977, and the "breakthrough" negotiations of November 1977 along with the final SALT II agreement. The primary concerns of the two sides remained the same. The US was focused on reducing or eliminating the threat to the survivability of its Minuteman ICBM force posed by the Soviet MIRVed, heavy ICBMs. The Soviets were primarily concerned about putting limits on the range and deployment of the US cruise missile, as well as the threat posed by all NATO nuclear forces. The debate about the Soviet Backfire bomber and the US cruise missiles were often at the center of the conflict, as was the problem of verifiability of treaty provisions.

Vladivostok (October – November 1974). When Ford completed his summit meeting with Brezhnev in Vladivostok in November 1974, he thought that with the SALT II negotiations were 90 to 95 percent complete, and he looked forward to signing a treaty sometime in the spring of 1975.⁹⁷ The groundwork had been laid out the month before in meetings between Kissinger, and Brezhnev and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, as well as in meetings between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin. Kissinger proposed the following in October 1974:⁹⁸

- A ceiling of 2,200 strategic nuclear launch vehicles (SNLVs)
- A sub-ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed SNLVs
- A limit of 250 “heavy” systems, including the Soviet’s SS-9 ICBM and the US B-52 and [future] B-1 heavy bombers
- A ban on air-to-surface missiles with ranges of over 3,000km
- Limit modernization on launchers to 175 per year

However, Brezhnev sought to have unequal ceilings on strategic launchers, proposing a ceiling of 2,400 for the USSR and 2,200 for the US in recognition of the approximately 200 British and French nuclear missiles.⁹⁹ They discussed an “equal aggregates” approach, whereby the Soviets would get more launchers while the US would get more MIRVs. Brezhnev said “nyet” on any cuts to Soviet heavy missiles, but he proposed a compromise on that issue—in exchange for not counting the American FBS or its NATO allies’ nuclear weapons capable of reaching the USSR, the US would not ask the Soviets to reduce their 308 heavy ICBMs.¹⁰⁰

The agreement on the framework for SALT II that was reached by Ford and Brezhnev in November 1974 still failed to reduce the number of Soviet heavy ICBMs. The Vladivostok accord included:¹⁰¹

- A ceiling of 2,400 SNLVs, including ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers
- A sub-ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs
- A duration from October 1977 through December 1983
- No compensation for forward-based systems
- Maintain SALT I ban on additional ICBM silos and ban on converting silos for light ICBMs into launchers for heavy ICBMs

The Soviet concession on FBS was a relief to the Americans, as was the agreement on equal levels of launchers which would make it much more palatable for the domestic US audience—particularly given the Jackson Amendment to SALT I. However, as former President Nixon noted, the Soviets resisted limits on throw weight and on the number of warheads (versus the number of MIRVed launchers)—the two limitations that would have made the greatest contribution to reducing the threat of a Soviet first strike capability destroying the ICBM component of the US strategic triad.

The inability of the US to overcome Soviet “intransigence” was due, in Nixon’s judgment, to the American’s not having much to bargain with.¹⁰² The agreement did, however, limit the risk to the US somewhat by limiting the growth of the number of Soviet warheads in the face of a rapid Soviet buildup in ICBMs and its efforts to MIRV those missiles.

For the Soviet’s part, the Vladivostok accord allowed them to continue their program of MIRVing ICBMs, and avoided any cuts in their heavy ICBMs, while placing limits on the Americans’ MIRVs when the US had already deployed 80 percent of the 1,320 limit.¹⁰³ Surprisingly, the Soviets never raised the issue of cruise missiles at the summit, but they soon sought to rectify that oversight. As noted in the discussion on interagency negotiations above, the issue of cruise missiles came up in the weeks following the summit as both sides sought to agree on an aide-memoire. Ultimately the Soviets prevailed on that point. Apparently in his haste to get an agreed-upon communiqué to show to Congress, Kissinger allowed the Soviets to leave out the word “ballistic” and to state that “air-to-surface missiles” were included in the 2,400 SNLV limit if they had a range over 600km.¹⁰⁴ The Americans considered the issue of cruise missiles unresolved; the Soviets thought they had won a concession. Finally, an issue that both sides recognized as being unresolved was whether the Soviet Backfire bomber should count as a “heavy” bomber, and therefore count under the 2,400 SNLV ceiling.

There was general support for the Vladivostok guidelines for SALT II. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it, and both the House and Senate passed resolutions supporting it.¹⁰⁵ However, the momentum was lost in the following months as the SALT delegations struggled with the cruise missile issue, the Backfire bomber, the verification of MIRVing, what constituted a “new” ICBM silo, and how to define “light” and “heavy” missiles. Domestic US public opinion and congressional opinion were beginning to turn against the Soviets, and new Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was wary of the agreement. The roots of congressional opposition were clearly there from the beginning, for as Kissinger admitted in a background briefing to the press the day after the Vladivostok summit, the accord did not provide a solution to the throw-weight “problem”; that would only be solved if the president would decide to deploy heavier missiles, which the accord permitted him to do.¹⁰⁶

Kissinger came close to working out an agreement with the Soviets in early 1976; however, based on domestic opposition within Congress and within the Ford Administration, the cruise missile and the Backfire issues remained unsettled. When the Soviets turned down Ford’s offer to conclude

a treaty based on the Vladivostok ceilings, with a three-year agreement on cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber, that ended the chances for a SALT II treaty with the presidential elections and Ford's hesitancy to push ahead with an agreement that was being criticized on all sides—for either doing too much to limit the US, or too little to limit both sides.

Carter: Comprehensive Proposal and Deferral Proposal (March 1977). As discussed above, Carter, with the urging of Secretary of Defense Brown and National Security Advisor Brzezinski, decided to push for major reductions in the ceilings agreed upon at Vladivostok. In a press briefing immediately after his meeting with Brezhnev and Gromyko, Secretary of State Vance revealed that the Soviets had turned down two proposals.¹⁰⁷ The first, a “deferral proposal,” proposed to defer the difficult cruise missile and Backfire bomber issues, and sign a treaty based on the agreements reached at Vladivostok. The second, the “comprehensive proposal” that Carter preferred and urged the Soviets to seriously consider, called for:¹⁰⁸

- A 20 percent reduction in the SNLV ceiling from 2,400 to 1,800
- A reduction in MIRV launchers from 1,320 to between 1,100 and 1,200
- A sub-limit of 550 MIRVed ICBMs
- A cut in large Soviet heavy ICBMs from 308 to 150
- A range limit of 2,500km on all cruise missiles and mobile missiles
- A limit of six ICBM flight tests per year
- A continued ban on construction of new ICBM launchers
- A continued ban on the modification of existing ICBMs
- A ban on the development, testing, and deployment of mobile ICBM launchers
- The Soviets to provide a list of measures to assure Backfire bomber would not be used as strategic launcher

The comprehensive proposal met US needs by reducing the number of Soviet MIRVs and heavy ICBMs, the major threat to US Minuteman ICBMs, and by slowing down the Soviet's ICBM programs in general, while the US could keep its 550 Minuteman ICBMs and accepted only minimal limitations on cruise missile range. However, the proposal failed to meet Soviet needs, and Brezhnev's needs in particular. The JCS

representative on the SALT negotiation team notes that his Soviet counterparts attributed the Soviet's outright rejection of the proposal to the fact that Brezhnev had staked his domestic credibility on the US acceptance of the Vladivostok accords.¹⁰⁹ ACDA's Warnke was told similarly that Brezhnev had "spilled political blood" in order to reach the compromise that excluded US FBS in return for the Soviet's maintaining all 308 heavy ICBMs.¹¹⁰

In his own press conference, Gromyko explained the Soviet's utter dissatisfaction with both proposals, noting that, contrary to what Vance had said to the press, there had not been progress. The problem with the "deferral proposal" was that it claimed that Vladivostok gave the "green light" to cruise missiles, but they should be considered under the limitations as air-to-surface missiles; Kissinger's aide memoire was coming back to haunt the US. Therefore, it was no "concession" for the US to put off dealing with the cruise missile, in particular because the Soviets "categorically rejected" the idea that the Backfire was a strategic weapon. Furthermore, in the comprehensive proposal the US proposed that the USSR "liquidate half of those rockets in our possession which are simply disliked by somebody in the United States" and the new ban against modernization would only hurt the Soviets' ICBMs while the US went ahead with its new B-1 bomber. Gromyko indicated that two proposals they had put forward in the past should also be open to renegotiation—not handing strategic weapons over to third countries and the advance deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe; if the Americans were going to reopen issues agreed upon at Vladivostok, then the Soviets were entitled to address these questions again. The Soviets decried the US attempt to gain unilateral advantage, and urged the Carter Administration to take up "a more realistic stand." In other words, the US needed to go back to the Soviets' understanding of Vladivostok.¹¹¹

"Breakthrough" in September 1977 and the Signed Agreement in June 1979. After the inauspicious beginning of SALT II negotiations under the new administration, Carter and his team recaptured some momentum later that year, despite other complicating factors such as the Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles and the Backfire bomber, and the US plans to deploy enhanced radiation weapons (ERWs or neutron bombs) as a response.¹¹² However, in September of that same year in a meeting between Carter, Vance, and Gromyko, the latter indicated that while the Soviets would not cut the number of their heavy missiles, they could negotiate a MIRVed ICBM subceiling in exchange for the US agreeing to count its cruise missiles on heavy bombers in the 1,320 MIRV limits, plus the Soviets would guarantee measures to assure the US that the

Backfire bomber would not have intercontinental range.¹¹³ Taking his cues from the Soviet concessions, and the apparent necessity that any SALT II agreement incorporate the 2,400 and 1,320 ceilings from the Vladivostok agreement, Brzezinski and some of his NSC staff came up with a three-tier proposal which included:¹¹⁴

- Initial ceiling of 2,400 SNLVs, to be lowered to 2,160 during life of treaty
- Subceiling of 1,320 MIRVed launchers, including cruise-missile-carrying bombers and MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs
- An additional subceiling of 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs
- A maximum of 800 MIRVed ICBMs

From the Soviet point of view, the proposal had the virtue of including the 2,400 and 1,320 limits from the Vladivostok accord, and it required the Americans to include long-range capable ALCMs under the subceiling for MIRVed launchers. From the American point of view, it limited the number of MIRVed ICBMs, which was beginning to be a bigger concern as the Soviets deployed the SS-19 and SS-18, and the US had to consider the possibility that the Soviets might MIRV all of their ICBMs.¹¹⁵ It also reduced the overall number of launchers and gave the US 120 “free” ALCM carriers—the difference between the 1,320 ceiling and the 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs that the Soviets would have.

Although it would take another 19 months until Carter and Brezhnev reached final accord in June 1979, the basic structure of SALT II limitations came from that November 1977 breakthrough. The major provisions of the final SALT II agreement included a treaty, a protocol and a joint statement of principles. The treaty included:¹¹⁶

- Limited SNLVs to 2,400, to be reduced to 2,250 by the end of 1981
- Subceiling of 1,320 ICBs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles (range greater than 600km)
- An additional sublimit of 1,200 missile launchers with MIRVs
- And within that sublimit a maximum of 820 ICBMs could be MIRVed

- A limit on modern large ICBMs frozen at 308 for USSR, 0 for US
- Ceilings on throw-weight and launch-weight for heavy/light ICBMs
- Limit of test one “new type” ICBM
- Fractionation limits—10 reentry vehicles (RVs) on new ICBM, 14 RVs on SLBMs, 10 RVs on air-to-surface ballistic missiles
- Ban on testing/deployment of ALCMs with range above 600km other than on long-range bombers
- Ban of heavy, mobile ICBMs, heavy SLBMs, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles
- Ban on ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 600km deployed on surface ships
- Advance notification of certain ICBM test launches
- Ban on ICBM systems that can be rapidly reloaded

As is often noted, “The devil is in the details.” And it was the many details related to these SALT II provisions that caused the negotiations to go on for months after the basic numerical ceilings and subceilings had been agreed upon. The issue of the Backfire bomber was only resolved the day that Carter signed SALT II, when Brezhnev told Carter that the Soviets would not produce more than 30 Backfire bombers a year—an agreement that was heavily criticized during Senate ratification hearings.¹¹⁷ Other politically contentious provisions related to the encryption of missile test data which impeded verification of “new types” of missiles, how the range of a cruise missile is counted, differentiating between conventional and nuclear cruise missiles, how to differentiate between MIRVed and unMIRVed ICBMs, and whether a mobile land-based missile—like the MX planned by the US—was verifiable and, hence, allowable.¹¹⁸ The US wanted the Soviets to concede that if one missile in an ICBM field was MIRVed, all missiles in that field would have to be counted as MIRVed because the US could not differentiate between the what was in the different silos using national technical means. However, at the same time, they wanted the Soviets to acquiesce to a mobile basing concept for the MX missile, where the survivability of US ICBMs would be enhanced precisely because the Soviets would not know what was in a missile silo. It was, as Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said, like a “ball of twine” with each issue in the negotiations tied to other issues.¹¹⁹

Implications of SALT II

Unlike its predecessors, SALT II was never ratified by the Senate, although both sides agreed to abide by its provisions and the US did so even into the first few years of the Reagan Administration. Its demise in the Senate was due to a combination of opposition within the broader defense community coupled with domestic politics and the negative linkages that inevitably occurred when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979. This section will highlight the shortcomings of the treaty, as well as the strengths of the treaty.

The vocal, organized opposition to the terms of the treaty was the single most important factor to its failure to pass. President Carter had been worried all along about getting support from Paul Nitze and Senator Jackson; in the end his treaty was vigorously opposed by both men. In fact, the “Committee on the Present Danger” was organized in 1976 specifically to watch over the SALT negotiations, and it used its significant resources and influential supporters from government, industry, and organized labor in order to publicize what it perceived to be the weaknesses of the treaty that was negotiated in 1979.¹²⁰ The Committee and other groups sought to get the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) involved in the ratification process, knowing that SASC member Senator Jackson would be willing and able to highlight the shortcomings of the treaty in a way that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee never would. A particularly convincing voice raised in opposition to the treaty was that of then Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowny, the JCS representative on the SALT II negotiation team in Geneva, who resigned in protest two weeks after President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the treaty. Rowny joined forces with the Committee and others who believed that SALT II would actually harm US security. The major perceived problems were that SALT II:

- Failed to reduce the threat that Soviet heavy ICBMs posed to US ICBMs
- Prohibited mobile ICBMs which would be necessary to ensure the survivability of US ICBMs
- Failed to achieve parity in throw weight
- Restricted US ability to develop a medium-heavy missile, due to inclusion of only two throw weight categories—light and heavy
- Allowed the Soviets to encrypt some of the telemetry data on missile test that were essential to assess the technical capability of

the missiles, particularly regarding the number of MIRVs, yield, and accuracy

- Failed to count the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic launch vehicle, leaving it as an unrestricted platform for cruise missiles in the future
- Restricted cruise missiles, an area of US superiority
- In conjunction with Carter's stopping the B-1 bomber and neutron bomb weapons, SALT II sapped the strength of US security

In support of SALT II, the treaty did deal with some of the difficult issues that SALT I had failed to address:

- It included quantitative limits on the number of MIRVed missile launchers, with sublimit on MIRVed ICBMs that posed greatest threat to US ICBMs
- It included fractionation limits on the number of warheads on MIRVed missiles which was significant given the Soviet throw weight advantage
- It finally defined what a "heavy" missile was
- It limited the development of new ICBMs
- It maintained the limit on the number of Soviet heavy ICBMs
- It reinforced the agreement that national technical means (NTMs) should not be interfered with
- It banned heavy, mobile ICBMs that the Soviets were developing and would have been destabilizing to mutual assured destruction

But perhaps most important of all, it maintained a constant channel for dialogue between the two superpowers, and provided for a degree of parity that reinforced the perceptions of both the US and the USSR that there was no advantage to be gained by a nuclear "first strike."

Perhaps the greatest benefit of SALT II was, like its SALT I and ABM predecessors, its contribution to reducing the likelihood of war between the US and the USSR, by engaging the two sides in negotiations that led to dialogue rather than confrontation on arms control and other areas of dispute. While SALT II included limits on total numbers of strategic launchers and limits on total numbers of warheads, it is not clear that these limits reduced the damages should a war have occurred, primarily because

those limits did not entail any reduction in forces, but instead allowed both sides to increase the number of nuclear weapons from their existing levels. Its contribution to the goal of reducing the costs of preparing for war are uncertain, as once again there seemed to be a buildup of certain defense programs—such as the cruise missile, the MX missile, and the B-1 bomber—associated with the treaty negotiations. SALT II was also invaluable in laying the basis for later agreements in terms of verification procedures, definitions, qualitative differentiation of weapons systems, and many other highly technical details that were first tackled by the SALT II negotiation teams. The SALT I and ABM treaties and the SALT II agreement provided the basis upon which future arms reductions agreements could and would be based.

NOTES

¹ John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: the Story of SALT* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 2.

² Gerard Smith, *Doubletalk: the Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitations Talks* (Doubleday & Company, 1980), 19. The US had been considering an Army-proposed ballistic missile defense system for several years, although there was significant opposition to the proposal because of the assessment by some—like the President’s Science Advisory Committee and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara—that an ABM was inconsistent with strategic stability. (See The National Security Archive at www.gwu.edu. “Missile Defense Thirty Years Ago: Déjà Vu All Over Again?” edited by William Burr, December 18, 2000, Document 1.)

³ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 146; Interview of Henry Kissinger for CNN’s “Cold War” series, Episode 16, aired February 7, 1999. Transcripts for the Cold War series are available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/.

⁴ Smith, 21.

⁵ “Final Report to the Congress of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird,” January 1969-January 1973, 12.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁸ “A Statement by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget, before the House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations,” February 25, 1970, 9-10.

⁹ Laird Final Report, 16, 21.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 35-36.

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- ¹¹ For brevity's sake, I will refer to both the offensive and defensive arms limitations negotiations as the SALT negotiations, since they were conducted concurrently and were not split into the separate SALT and ABM agreements until late in the process.
- ¹² "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT; Henry A. Kissinger; Modified Sentinel System," March 5, 1969, available in the National Security Archives, "Missile Defense Thirty Years Ago," Document 4, at www.gwu.edu.
- ¹³ Richard M. Nixon, *The Real War* (Warner Books, 1980), 167-169.
- ¹⁴ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 136. (Quoting from Nixon memo to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Director of the CIA Richard Helms on February 4, 1969.)
- ¹⁵ Edward L. Rowny, *It Takes One to Tango* (Brassey's, Inc., 1992), 21.
- ¹⁶ Interview of Henry Kissinger, for CNN's "Cold War" series, episode 16, aired February 7, 1999. Transcripts available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/
- ¹⁷ Garthoff, 153.
- ¹⁸ Smith, 32; Newhouse, 173.
- ¹⁹ Garthoff, 153; Kissinger, 149-150.
- ²⁰ Garthoff, 220, footnote 159.
- ²¹ Smith, 34-35.
- ²² Newhouse, 5.
- ²³ Newhouse 146-7, 178; *Kissinger Transcripts*, 7-8.
- ²⁴ *Kissinger Transcripts*, 8.
- ²⁵ Kissinger, 540-544.
- ²⁶ Melvin Laird, Top Secret [declassified] Memorandum on "FY73 Safeguard Program," 27 February 1972, available in the National Security Archives, "Missile Defense Thirty Years Ago," Document 20, at www.gwu.edu.
- ²⁷ Gerard Smith, 26.
- ²⁸ Smith, 154, 156.
- ²⁹ Newhouse, 41-42.
- ³⁰ Smith, 30.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 29.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 27.
- ³³ Kissinger, 541-543, Newhouse, 176-178, Garthoff, 154-155. The Verification Panel was chaired by Kissinger and included: Under Secretary of State Elliott Richardson, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard; Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Thomas Moorer; CIA Director Richard Helms, ACDA Director and Chief SALT Negotiator Gerald Smith, and Attorney General John Mitchell. See Newhouse, 178.
- ³⁴ Kissinger, 542. Garthoff, 154-155. (Kissinger indicated that State's first preference was for Option D, however, this author included Garthoff's recollection of his own agency's position as Option C.)
- ³⁵ Kissinger, 544.
- ³⁶ Garthoff, 154-155.

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- ³⁷ Newhouse, 170.
- ³⁸ Garthoff, 154.
- ³⁹ Kissinger, 541
- ⁴⁰ Kissinger, 540; Garthoff, 154
- ⁴¹ Kissinger, 546.
- ⁴² Kissinger, 546; Newhouse, 180; Smith, 170.
- ⁴³ Garthoff, 157-158; Smith 171-173.
- ⁴⁴ Garthoff 157-158; Smith 171-173; Newhouse, 180-181.
- ⁴⁵ Garthoff, 159, footnote 34.
- ⁴⁶ Newhouse, 194-195.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., 195.
- ⁴⁸ Smith, 225.
- ⁴⁹ Smith, 228. Garthoff, 180-181.
- ⁵⁰ Garthoff, 181.
- ⁵¹ Smith, 320.
- ⁵² Garthoff, 183, 185.
- ⁵³ Ibid., 187.
- ⁵⁴ Smith, 372-375.
- ⁵⁵ Garthoff, 193-194; Newhouse, 252; Smith, 417.
- ⁵⁶ Garthoff, 216, 217.
- ⁵⁷ *The Kissinger Transcripts* ed. William Burr (The New Press, 1998), 219.
- ⁵⁸ See, for example, Smith, 461.
- ⁵⁹ Garthoff, 217.
- ⁶⁰ Kissinger, 550.
- ⁶¹ "Annual Defense Department Report for FY 1976 and FY 197T," Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, I-10.
- ⁶² Secretary of Defense FY1976 Report, I-5.
- ⁶³ "Annual Defense Department Report for FY 1977," Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, ii-iii.
- ⁶⁴ See "Annual Defense Department Report" for FY 1974 through FY 1977.
- ⁶⁵ "FY 1977 Annual Defense Department Report," iii-iv.
- ⁶⁶ Nixon, *The Real War*, 171.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., 173.
- ⁶⁸ Talbott, 100.
- ⁶⁹ Interview of Gerald Ford for CNN's "Cold War" series, Episode 16, aired February 7, 1999. Transcripts for the Cold War series are available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/
- ⁷⁰ Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Bantam Books, 1982), 259-260.
- ⁷¹ Talbott, 24-25.
- ⁷² Nixon, 171.
- ⁷³ Interview of Leslie Gelb for CNN's "Cold War" series, Episode 19, aired February 28, 1999.
- ⁷⁴ *Kissinger Transcripts*, 125.

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- ⁷⁵ Rowny, 88.
- ⁷⁶ See: Rowny, 90; *Kissinger Transcripts*, 429; Garthoff, 881. Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft also noted the decisive role played by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in a telephone interview conducted by Major Charles Dusch, USAF, on July 15, 2001.
- ⁷⁷ Ford, 357.
- ⁷⁸ Scowcroft interview, July 15, 2001; Garthoff, 599; Talbott, 37.
- ⁷⁹ Talbott, 37; Garthoff, 598-599.
- ⁸⁰ Talbott, 50.
- ⁸¹ Ibid., 50.
- ⁸² Carter, 222, 239.
- ⁸³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principal* (Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 316.
- ⁸⁴ Brzezinski, 317.
- ⁸⁵ Brzezinski, 317, Talbott, 146-7.
- ⁸⁶ Garthoff, 887.
- ⁸⁷ Garthoff, 498-500. Also see Talbott, 33-35.
- ⁸⁸ Garthoff, 598.
- ⁸⁹ Vance, 48; Talbott, 65.
- ⁹⁰ Garthoff, 498; Rowny, 71.
- ⁹¹ Talbott, 61; Vance, 48.
- ⁹² Talbott, 61.
- ⁹³ Rowny, 107-108.
- ⁹⁴ Talbot, 183.
- ⁹⁵ Garthoff, 901-902; Talbott, 183-186.
- ⁹⁶ Talbott, 189.
- ⁹⁷ Ford "Cold War" Interview; Garthoff, 497.
- ⁹⁸ Garthoff, 494.
- ⁹⁹ *Kissinger Transcripts*, 352.
- ¹⁰⁰ Garthoff, 495-6.
- ¹⁰¹ *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume II*, ed. Richard Dean Burns (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1999), 900; Garthoff, 497; Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Vladivostok, 24 November 1974. *Department of State Bulletin*, 23 December 1974, 898-905. Cited in *SALT Handbook: Key Documents and Issues, 1972-1979*, ed. Roger P. Labrie (American Enterprise Institute: Washington 1979), 284.
- ¹⁰² Nixon, 172.
- ¹⁰³ *Encyclopedia*, 900.
- ¹⁰⁴ Garthoff, 498; Rowny, 71.
- ¹⁰⁵ Garthoff, 501.
- ¹⁰⁶ Background briefing of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, 25 November 1974, in *SALT Handbook*, 288.
- ¹⁰⁷ Press conference of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance. *Department of State Bulletin*, 25 April 1977, 400-404, cited in *SALT Handbook*, 428.

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- ¹⁰⁸ *Encyclopedia of Arms Control*, 901; Vance Press Conference, in *SALT Handbook*, 428-429.
- ¹⁰⁹ Rowny, 104-105.
- ¹¹⁰ Garthoff, 889; Talbott, 72.
- ¹¹¹ Remarks to the press by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Moscow, 31 March 1977. *News and Views From the USSR*, Soviet Embassy Information Department, Washington, DC, in *SALT Handbook*, 435-442.
- ¹¹² Brzezinski, 301-307.
- ¹¹³ Talbott, 124-128; Garthoff, 896.
- ¹¹⁴ Talbott, 126.
- ¹¹⁵ Garthoff, 895-897.
- ¹¹⁶ *Encyclopedia of Arms Control*, 902.
- ¹¹⁷ Rowny, 122.
- ¹¹⁸ Talbott, 178-202; Rowny, 121-122.
- ¹¹⁹ Talbott, 212.
- ¹²⁰ Rowny, 123.
